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PROTECTING GUN RIGHTS AND IMPROVING GUN CONTROL
AFTER DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER
by
Allen Rostron ∗
The Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, rejecting
the narrow interpretation of the Second Amendment that most courts
previously embraced, might seem to be a significant setback for gun control
supporters and a major victory for gun rights advocates. Challenging that
conventional wisdom, the author contends that Heller ultimately will help
rather than hinder the push toward strong, sensible gun control laws. Justice
Scalia’s opinion for the majority in Heller ultimately backs away from the
most drastic implications of its reasoning and instead steers toward a more
moderate approach under which virtually all existing gun laws should be
upheld. Developments since Heller, including the continuing controversy
over gun laws in the District of Columbia and the lower courts’ reactions to
a wave of post-Heller challenges to the constitutionality of various federal
and state gun laws, suggest that the ultimate effects of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Heller will be far less dramatic than many initially expected. In
the long run, the Heller decision’s most important effect may be to reduce
the intensity and bitterness of the nation’s political and cultural debate over
guns. By confirming that reasonable gun regulations will not lead to extreme
measures like prohibition of all guns, Heller may turn out to be an
important victory for both gun control and gun rights.
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INTRODUCTION

Before becoming a law professor, I was a senior staff attorney at the
Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, the nation’s largest and most
1
influential “gun control” organization. As part of that job, I frequently
participated in debates about the Second Amendment right “to keep and
2
bear [a]rms.” I argued that the right pertains only to having and using
guns in connection with some form of organized, public, military activity.
The speakers on the other side of these debates—including gun rights
activists and representatives of groups like the National Rifle Association
(NRA), Gun Owners of America, and the Second Amendment
Foundation—insisted that the right was broader, reaching possession and
use of guns for private, non-military purposes such as hunting or
protection from crime. It was an enormously complex and intriguing
question of constitutional interpretation, giving us plenty to volley back
and forth before a wide array of audiences, from high school students to
congressional staff members, interested in hearing about the issue.
I came up with a dramatic way to emphasize the enormous weight of
precedent that supported my point of view. I would pull out a folder,
several inches thick, stuffed with copies of dozens of opinions from
federal appellate courts across the country, and announce, “This is where
I keep copies of all the decisions that support my reading of the Second
Amendment.” After ruffling through the contents a bit to underscore
their bulk, I would pull out a markedly thinner folder and say, “This is
where I keep all the cases that go the other way.” After giving the
audience a few moments to take in the striking contrast between the sizes
of the two folders, I would let the second one fall open to reveal that it
had nothing inside it. “As you can see,” I would explain with relish, “all of
the precedent is on my side.” That demonstration always earned a few
laughs from the audience, while effectively illustrating the overwhelming
judicial consensus about the Second Amendment’s narrowly limited
reach.
How quickly things can change. In less than a decade, what was a
unanimous and seemingly solid wall of precedent about the Second
Amendment’s limited reach has been swept aside. The U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller decisively rejected the
narrow interpretation of the Second Amendment that had previously
3
prevailed in courts across the country.
At first blush, Heller seems to be a major setback for gun control
advocates and a tremendous victory for gun rights proponents. The real
significance of the decision, however, remains to be determined, not only
in future court battles but also in political and legislative arenas. Contrary
1
See Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, About Us, http://www.
bradycenter.org/about/.
2
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
3
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
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to conventional wisdom, I believe Heller ultimately will turn out to be
much more of an aid than a detriment to the push toward strong,
sensible gun laws. In the long run, the Supreme Court’s decision may
help to drive the nation away from unproductive bickering over guns and
toward reasonable compromises and real progress on the issue.
Part II of this Article examines the Supreme Court’s decision in
Heller, focusing in particular on several passages of the majority opinion
suggesting that the Second Amendment will provide only a moderate and
limited right to keep and bear arms. Part III looks at what has occurred
in the first ten months since the Heller decision. These events, in the
District of Columbia as it amends its laws in reaction to the Supreme
Court’s ruling, and in the lower courts as judges face the leading edge of
a wave of Second Amendment challenges to gun laws and regulations,
suggest that only the most extraordinarily drastic legal restrictions on
guns should be struck down under Heller and the vast majority of current
gun laws will withstand constitutional attacks. Finally, Part IV suggests
that the Heller decision may actually prove to be a blessing for those who
want a strong but reasonable system of legal controls on guns. By ruling
out extreme policy options, such as banning all handguns, the Supreme
Court’s decision could help dissolve the current partisan, ideological,
and cultural divide over guns and bring more people together to seek a
sensible middle ground on the issue.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN HELLER

The debate over the meaning of the Second Amendment, and
whether it should be construed as protecting access to guns for private,
non-military purposes, has been raging for years and surely will continue
for many more. Detailed critiques and defenses of the Heller majority’s
and dissents’ analyses will be offered. In my view, however, the opinions
produced by justices on each side of the fight in Heller merely confirm
that this is a question on which there is no real “right” or “wrong” answer.
Instead, the meaning of the Second Amendment “is in the eye of the
beholder, with both sides equally and sincerely able to find what they
4
want to see.” Indeed, the issue provides persuasive support to Judge
Richard Posner’s candid recognition that, no matter how observers or
the Supreme Court justices themselves may pretend otherwise, these
sorts of constitutional issues do not have objective answers:
Almost a quarter century as a federal appellate judge has convinced
me that it is rarely possible to say with a straight face of a Supreme
Court constitutional decision that it was decided correctly or
incorrectly. When one uses terms like “correct” and “incorrect” in
this context, all one can actually mean is that one likes (approves
4
Allen Rostron, Op-Ed., Middle Ground: The Supreme Court’s Opportunity in DC v.
Heller, JURIST, Apr. 2, 2008, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2008/04/middleground-supreme-courts.php.
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of, agrees with, or is comfortable with) the decision in question or
dislikes (disapproves of, disagrees with, or is uncomfortable with) it.
One may be able to give reasons for liking or disliking the
decision—the thousands of pages of Supreme Court Forewords
attest this to any doubter—and people who agree with the reasons
will be inclined to say that the decision is correct or incorrect. But
that is just a form of words. One can, for that matter,
notwithstanding the maxim de gustibus non est disputandum, give
reasons for preferring a Margarita to a Cosmopolitan. The problem,
in both cases, is that there are certain to be equally articulate,
“reasonable” people who disagree and can offer plausible reasons
for their disagreement, and there will be no common metric that
will enable a disinterested observer (if there is such a person) to
5
decide who is right.

For the most part, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority of the
Supreme Court in Heller is a solid presentation of textual arguments and
historical evidence for interpreting the Second Amendment broadly to
protect non-military use of guns. It offers a plausible portrait of how
some citizens of the founding generation might have understood the
Second Amendment’s terms. The most striking passages of the opinion,
however, are those in which Scalia suddenly strays from his efforts to
divine the provision’s original meaning. Tossing aside his chosen
methodology when it does not suit his purposes, Scalia makes a series of
crucial assertions for which he conspicuously neglects to offer any real
support or evidence about original understandings of the constitutional
text.
The most prominent example, already receiving abundant attention
6
from lower courts, comes toward the end of Scalia’s opinion when he
acknowledges that the right to keep and bear arms is limited and
consistent with extensive government regulation of guns; he then goes
out of his way to offer examples of the sorts of laws that should survive
7
constitutional attack. Scalia first suggests that prohibitions on carrying
8
concealed weapons do not violate the Second Amendment. For this, he
provides at least some sort of support, although it consists merely of
citations to a few cases and legal treatises establishing that some (but not
all) courts in the nineteenth century upheld the constitutionality of
9
concealed weapon bans. That hardly seems like compelling evidence of
the Second Amendment’s original meaning, but it is apparently enough.

5

Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 40–41
(2005). The Latin phrase mentioned by Posner means “There’s no disputing about
taste” or “There’s no accounting for taste.” THE NEW DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL
LITERACY 49 (E.D. Hirsch, Jr. et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002).
6
See infra Part III.B.
7
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17.
8
Id. at 2816.
9
Id.
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The majority then offers a list of other “presumptively lawful
10
regulatory measures,” but without even trying to explain how it has
arrived at the conclusion that these particular sorts of gun control laws
are constitutional:
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis
today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions
on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and
11
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.
The opinion notes that this list is not complete, and so there may be
12
other gun control measures that are “presumptively” valid as well.
The majority’s endorsement of these sorts of sensible restrictions on
guns helps make Heller seem like a much less radical decision. Personally,
I agree that each of the measures on the majority’s list should be a
constitutionally permissible means of regulating firearms. They are
reasonable policy measures that do not excessively burden anyone’s
legitimate interests in being able to own and use guns. Scalia and the
other four members of the majority in Heller cannot say that though,
because it runs counter to their insistence that the Court should not be
13
engaging in any sort of public policy or “interest-balancing” analysis.
The fact that the majority endorses these measures in a cursory bit of
dicta, without engaging in any real analysis, undermines the pretense
that their originalist methodology truly drives their decision-making
rather than merely serving as a convenient way to cloak their conclusions
with an air of objectivity and detachment from contemporary political
and ideological preferences.
The same can be seen in the portion of the opinion that explains
why the Second Amendment gives District of Columbia residents a right
to possess handguns and not just rifles and shotguns:
There are many reasons that a citizen may prefer a handgun for
home defense: It is easier to store in a location that is readily
accessible in an emergency; it cannot easily be redirected or
wrestled away by an attacker; it is easier to use for those without the
upper-body strength to lift and aim a long gun; it can be pointed at
14
a burglar with one hand while the other hand dials the police.
Justice Scalia is an avid hunter; he knows a lot about guns, enjoys
using them, and is certainly entitled to whatever personal views he may
have about the relative merits of handguns versus long guns for home

10
11
12
13
14

Id. at 2817 n.26.
Id. at 2816–17.
Id. at 2817 n.26.
Id. at 2821.
Id. at 2818.
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15

defense purposes. But his reliance on that sort of nakedly personal
assessment of a public policy issue, to resolve a crucial legal issue in a
landmark decision on the Constitution’s meaning, is startling. It looks
very much like the sort of “judge-empowering” “interest-balancing” that
16
he denounces the dissenters in Heller for endorsing.
Meanwhile, the majority opinion artfully dodges one of the stickiest
dilemmas that has plagued those arguing for a broad reading of the
Second Amendment: If everyone has a right to keep and bear arms for
personal, private purposes, does that mean they have a right to even the
17
most potent military weaponry? Perhaps some of the most ardent
advocates for gun rights might think so, but Scalia and his colleagues on
the Supreme Court surely did not want to be viewed as going to that
extreme. Imagine how most of the American public and press would have
reacted to Heller if it announced that everyone now has a right to amass
their own arsenals of machine guns, bazookas, rocket-propelled grenade
launchers, and shoulder-fired missiles.
Scalia manages to stay on more moderate ground by concluding that
the Second Amendment protects only weapons currently in “common
18
use” among American civilians. He would conclude, for example, that
the government can ban machine guns, not because they pose a
particularly serious threat to public safety, but because the government
has been heavily regulating and restricting them for so long that they are
19
not in common use among civilians. He concocts his “common use”

15

Scalia is an “enthusiastic hunter” who has called for efforts to change “[t]he
attitude of people associating guns with nothing but crime.” Clay Carey, Scalia
Champions Hunting and Conservation, TENNESSEAN, Feb. 26, 2006, at 1B (describing
Scalia’s address to the annual convention of the National Wild Turkey Federation). In
2007, Scalia received the “Sport Shooting Ambassador Award,” an annual honor
bestowed by the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities, an
international association of gun makers and gun rights organizations such as the
NRA. Josh Sugarmann, “Sport Shooting Ambassador Award” Winner Antonin Scalia’s 2nd
Amendment Ruling Does His Gun Pals Proud, June 26, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
josh-sugarmann/sport-shooting-ambassador_b_109367.html.
16
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821.
17
For discussion of and proposed solutions to this dilemma, see, for example,
Richard A. Allen, What Arms? A Textualist’s View of the Second Amendment, 18 GEO.
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 191 (2008); Stephen P. Halbrook, What the Framers Intended: A
Linguistic Analysis of the Right to “Bear Arms,” 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 157–60
(1986); David T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the
Second Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 635–37 (1986); Don B. Kates, Jr.,
Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV.
204, 258–64 (1983); David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century,
1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1359, 1531–34 (1998); Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the
Individual’s Right to Arms, 31 GA. L. REV. 1, 41–46 (1996).
18
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2815, 2817 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174,
179 (1939)).
19
Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (No. 07-290). In fact,
civilians in the United States currently possess about 400,000 legal, registered
machine guns and an unknown number of illegal, unregistered ones. See OFFICE OF
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20

limitation by quoting United States v. Miller, a 1939 case that produced
the Court’s most extensive discussion of the Second Amendment prior to
Heller. In Miller, the Court emphasized that the Second Amendment must
be interpreted and applied with an eye to its “obvious purpose” of
21
ensuring the “continuation” and “effectiveness” of militias. Explaining
what the term “militia” meant to the founding generation, the Miller
opinion stated that the militia “comprised all males physically capable of
acting in concert for the common defense,” and that “ordinarily when
called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms
22
supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.”
Scalia latches on to the phrase “common use,” turning it into a basis for
limiting the Second Amendment’s reach so that it does not extend to the
sorts of weapons that would actually be most useful for ensuring the
effectiveness of militia forces.
While it is easy to understand the practical and political reasons why
Scalia and his fellow justices would hesitate to extend constitutional
protection to private possession of the most destructive military
armaments, Scalia’s selective reliance on one snippet from Miller is a
brazenly manipulative way of reaching that result. On the overarching
issue of whether the Second Amendment protects non-military use of
guns, Scalia fervently derides Miller as a precedent, claiming that it
contains absolutely no discussion of the history of the Second
Amendment, and that it resulted from a one-sided proceeding in which
23
only the government filed a brief or presented any argument.
According to Scalia, the fact that the defendants in Miller were fugitives
and their counsel was therefore barred from presenting their side of the
issues to the Court is “reason enough, one would think, not to make that
case the beginning and the end of this Court's consideration of the
24
Second Amendment.” When it comes to the question of what weapons
the Second Amendment protects, however, Scalia is happy to cherry-pick
language from an opinion that he otherwise disparages as dubious
precedent.
In doing so, Scalia also distorts what Miller said. Miller did not hold
that the Second Amendment protects only weapons in common use; it
held that the Second Amendment protects only weapons having a
reasonable connection to militia service. Specifically, the Miller opinion
stated that the crucial consideration was whether a firearm was “part of
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT NO. I-2007-006, THE BUREAU OF
ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES’ NAT’L FIREARMS REGISTRATION AND
TRANSFER RECORD 2 (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/ATF/

e0706/final.pdf (reporting that ATF records included registrations for 391,532
machine guns as of November 2006).
20
307 U.S. at 179.
21
Id. at 178.
22
Id. at 179.
23
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2814.
24
Id.
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the ordinary military equipment” or could “contribute to the common
25
defense.” That was the test. That is why the government prevailed in the
case: there was no evidence that the gun in question, a sawed-off shotgun,
26
was suited for military use.
After reaching that conclusion, the Court in Miller then went on to
discuss the meaning of “militia,” noting that militia members in early
America ordinarily brought their own guns when called up for militia
service, and therefore militia forces were typically equipped with the sorts
27
of guns in common use in that era. But contrary to Scalia’s twisted
reading of the decision, Miller simply did not say that the Second
Amendment protects only firearms in common use among civilians.
Put another way, Miller held that the legal test under the Second
Amendment is X (military usefulness), and then mentioned that many
guns that are X will also be Y (in common use). Scalia pretends that
Miller said the test is Y. By doing that, Scalia can adopt the broad reading
that he wants to give to the Second Amendment in some respects, while
avoiding the scary and politically unpalatable prospect that it gives
private individuals a right to arm themselves with the sorts of potent
weaponry that would actually be most useful for modern combat by
militia forces. Scalia and his colleagues thus sacrifice logical consistency
and faithful reading of precedent in order to construct an interpretation
of the Second Amendment more in harmony with contemporary public
opinion. Scalia wants to give us a right to keep and bear arms that is farreaching in some ways but not others, and his strained interpretation of
Miller allows him to find what he wants to find in the Constitution.
Aside from his selective reliance on Miller, Scalia asserts that his
limitation of the Second Amendment’s protection to guns in “common
use” today is “fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting
28
the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’” I agree that we
should exclude extraordinarily dangerous weapons from the protection
of the Second Amendment, because that is an eminently sensible thing to
do, but that is true regardless of whether policy makers in the early 1800s
reached the same conclusion. Scalia nevertheless insists on hiding his
policy preferences under the guise of discerning “traditions.” One of the
crucial but unarticulated principles of his method of constitutional
25
Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. Immediately after making this point, the Miller opinion
confirmed and re-emphasized it by citing a Tennessee court decision which
unequivocally declared that the right to keep and bear arms applies only to guns
useful for military purposes. See id. (citing Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 158
(1840) (“As the object for which the right to keep and bear arms is secured is of
general and public nature, to be exercised by the people in a body, for their common
defence, so the arms the right to keep which is secured are such as are usually
employed in civilized warfare, and that constitute the ordinary military
equipment.”)).
26
Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
27
Id. at 179.
28
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817.
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interpretation seems to be that if judges make policy arguments
supported by citations to sources from the nineteenth century, they are
properly giving weight to tradition, but if they make policy arguments
supported by citations to sources from the twentieth or twenty-first
centuries, they are engaged in illegitimate legislating from the bench.
29
Scalia’s “faint-hearted” version of originalism begins to seem not only
methodologically unsound, but like an antiquarian fetish that obscures
more than it contributes to decision-making.
Despite his penchant for historical evidence of early American
understandings, Scalia conspicuously avoids mentioning one significant
but notorious antebellum precedent. In Dred Scott v. Sandford, the
Supreme Court held that people of African descent could not be
30
American citizens protected by the Constitution. In doing so, Chief
Justice Roger Taney’s opinion explained that a contrary conclusion
would be absurd because it would mean that “persons of the negro race”
would have rights that included the freedom “to keep and carry arms
31
wherever they went.” That was a clear expression of an understanding
by a majority of the Supreme Court, albeit in dicta, that the Second
Amendment protects a right that extends beyond use of guns for
organized military activities. Dred Scott therefore has long been a key
piece of evidence for those arguing for a broad interpretation of the
32
Second Amendment. Scalia never cites it, even though it would provide
strong support for his interpretation of the Second Amendment,
apparently preferring to avoid mention of a case that has become
infamous for its repugnant views about race. Once again, Scalia puts
considerations about the “optics” of his decision ahead of the substance
of his analysis, ignoring key precedent that has a bad reputation for
reasons unrelated to the issue at hand.
Of all the things that Scalia’s majority opinion in Heller does to make
its reading of the Constitution appear less threatening to moderate,
mainstream audiences, the most important maneuver is to downplay the
notion that the Second Amendment was meant to ensure that the
American people would be well armed to fight against their own
government if necessary. Gun rights advocates have heavily emphasized
that point for years, arguing that the primary purpose of the Amendment
33
was to enable Americans to deter and to resist tyranny. The idea has
29
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862–63
(1989) (describing how a “faint-hearted” originalist would not be willing to accept all
consequences of an entirely originalist interpretation of the Constitution).
30
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
31
Id. at 417.
32
See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 651
(1989) (noting that “Taney’s seeming recognition of a right to arms is much relied on
by opponents of gun control”).
33
See, e.g., David B. Kopel & Christopher C. Little, Communitarians, Neorepublicans,
and Guns: Assessing the Case for Firearms Prohibition, 56 MD. L. REV. 438, 466 (1997)
(contending that “[v]irtually all legal scholarship on the Second Amendment from
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even been captured in a slogan emblazoned on bumper stickers: “The
34
Second Amendment is not about duck hunting.” Although the meaning
of that saying may be opaque to many, it is well understood by gun rights
proponents:
The Second Amendment isn’t about duck hunting, nor about
shooting lone criminals, although both activities were considered
morally laudable. The Second Amendment at its core is about fear
of a criminal federal government in general, and fear of a federal
standing army in particular. Uniformed, professional, heavily armed
employees of the central government in Washington—these were
the people that the authors of the Constitution wisely feared would
be more loyal to centralized authority than to the communities of
35
America.
The validity of this line of argument has been one of the most
incendiary issues in the debate over the Second Amendment’s meaning.
Some commentators criticize it as a dangerous “insurrectionist” theory,
saying that it is absurd to think the founders of this nation meant to
enshrine a constitutional right to amass weapons for use in violent
revolutionary actions, and that such an interpretation of the Second
Amendment would lend justification to anti-government acts like
Timothy McVeigh’s murderous bombing of the federal building in
36
Oklahoma City in 1995. On the opposite side, some argue that the
continuing need for a heavily armed citizenry as a check against despotic
government action is proven by modern events like federal law
enforcement’s confrontation with the Branch Davidian religious group at
37
Waco, Texas, in 1994. Whatever one thinks of the resistance-to-tyranny
rationale, it has been a central part of the debate and a fundamental
component of the so-called “Standard Model” of the Second Amendment
developed by scholars and other commentators urging courts to

the last two decades” agrees that “one of the major reasons the Amendment was
included in the Bill of Rights was to ensure the perpetuation of a force of armed
citizens that could resist domestic tyranny when—but only when—it was absolutely
necessary”).
34
S. Vaughn Binzer, Against Handgun Ban, ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 30, 1992, at 28.
35
David B. Kopel, On the Firing Line: Clinton’s Crime Bill, in THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION LECTURES NO. 476 (1993), available at http://www.heritage.org/
Research/Crime/HL476.cfm.
36
See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 309, 386–87 (1998); Dennis Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment,
26 VAL. U. L. REV. 107, 109–12 (1991); Harold S. Herd, A Re-Examination of the Firearms
Regulation Debate and Its Consequences, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 196, 198, 237–240 (1997);
Robert J. Spitzer, Lost and Found: Researching the Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 349, 359–63 (2000).
37
See Kopel, supra note 35 (“Already we live in a world where federal agencies
feel free to assault on specious charges a peaceful community which happens to have
eccentric religious beliefs and a lot of firearms.”); cf. David C. Williams, The Militia
Movement and Second Amendment Revolution: Conjuring with the People, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 879 (1996) (examining the Second Amendment views of the militia movement).
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reconsider and reject precedent limiting the right to keep and bear arms
38
to military endeavors. According to the gun rights advocates who have
most exhaustively studied the issue, the people’s ability to resist their own
government is the very core of the right guaranteed by the Second
39
Amendment.
The striking thing about Justice Scalia’s handling of this point in
Heller is that he says so little about it. The idea makes only scant
appearances in the majority’s opinion. For example, when he explains
why a militia was thought to be necessary to the security of a free state,
Scalia mentions that, among other things, “when the able-bodied men of
a nation are trained in arms and organized, they are better able to resist
40
tyranny.” Considering its central importance in the Second Amendment
debate, however, the idea gets very little attention in the quite lengthy
majority opinion.
Shying away from the resistance-to-tyranny rationale, the Heller
majority instead portrays the Second Amendment, at every opportunity,
as an anti-crime measure. Scalia posits that it “guarantee[s] the individual
41
right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,” it
42
“enable[s] individuals to defend themselves,” and it “surely elevates
above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to
43
use arms in defense of hearth and home.” Scalia even asserts, without
citing any authority and despite the very glaring evidence to the contrary
in the Second Amendment’s text, that most early Americans
“undoubtedly” thought the right to keep and bear arms was “even more
important for self-defense and hunting” than for preventing elimination
44
of the militia. Individual self-defense is, Scalia insists, “the central
45
component of the right.”
Scalia’s opinion is a very skillful and impressive piece of work, but it
is ultimately the work of an advocate. It is a highly selective, resultoriented presentation of the issues, produced by someone laboring hard
not only to reach a particular result, but also to deliver that result
wrapped in the most appealing possible packaging for mainstream public
tastes. It is not the product of judges earnestly striving to act merely as
umpires calling balls and strikes, as soon-to-be Chief Justice John Roberts
38

See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model, the
Second Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 16
CONST. COMMENT. 221, 237–245 (1999); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the
Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461, 466–71 (1995).
39
Kopel, supra note 35.
40
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2801 (2008).
41
Id. at 2797.
42
Id. at 2799.
43
Id. at 2821.
44
Id. at 2801.
45
Id.; see also id. at 2817 (“[T]he inherent right of self-defense has been central to
the Second Amendment right.”); id. at 2818 (describing self defense as the right’s
“core” purpose).
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46

once famously described his conception of the judicial role. While
Scalia’s majority opinion repeatedly condemns the District of Columbia
and the dissenting members of the Supreme Court for selectively
47
disregarding historical reality, overstating the conclusions that can be
48
drawn from historical sources, and reaching conclusions ultimately
49
driven by contemporary, personal policy preferences, the majority itself
is guilty of every one of those same faults.
For gun control supporters, the good news is that Scalia’s most
questionable analytical maneuvers have the effect of making the Heller
decision less of a threat to gun laws currently in effect and less of an
obstacle to those that might be adopted in the future. While Scalia’s dicta
endorsing several significant types of gun regulations as “presumptively
valid” may be a brazen departure from what otherwise purports to be his
approach to judging in general and constitutional interpretation in
50
particular, it is a crucial cue to lower court judges that is likely to
minimize greatly the Heller decision’s impact. Likewise, Scalia’s arguments
for limiting the Second Amendment’s protection to guns currently in
51
“common use” may strain precedent, history, and logic, but it is
ultimately a welcome conclusion to anyone who favors tight restrictions
on civilian access to the most potent types of weapons. Whether he was
merely trying to give the Court’s decision a veneer of moderation, or also
struggling to hold the support of all four justices who joined him, his
opinion winds up steering closer to the middle ground of the gun debate
and away from the most extreme consequences it might have triggered.
III. POST-HELLER DEVELOPMENTS

The ultimate impact of the Heller decision will not become fully clear
for some time. Events during the first ten months after the Supreme
Court’s announcement of its ruling, however, suggest that the decision’s
consequences will be much smaller than many gun control supporters
may have feared and many gun rights proponents may have expected.
A. Revising the District of Columbia’s Laws

The Heller decision’s most direct effect obviously would be in the
District of Columbia. The Supreme Court’s ruling clearly meant that the
District needed to make some revisions to its gun laws, but the extent of
the required changes has been the subject of great controversy.

46
47
48
49
50
51

Roberts: ‘I Have No Agenda,’ WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2005, at A7.
See, e.g., Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801–02.
See, e.g., id. at 2819–21.
See, e.g., id. at 2821.
See supra notes 7–13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 18–29 and accompanying text.
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The D.C. Council and Mayor Adrian Fenty felt that Heller demanded
only minimal changes, and they were not inclined to loosen legal
52
restrictions on guns any more than necessary. In a measure passed just a
few weeks after the issuance of the Heller decision, the Council amended
the District’s firearm laws to permit registration of a handgun by any
53
person “for use in self-defense within that person’s home.” Stopping at
the bare minimum required by Heller, the new law barred anyone from
54
having more than a single handgun, and it made clear that the
handgun generally must remain in the owner’s home and cannot be
55
carried elsewhere. The D.C. Council retained the other key provision
struck down by the Supreme Court—the requirement that any firearm in
a person’s home be kept unloaded and either disassembled or secured by
a trigger lock, gun safe, or similar device—but added an exception
permitting a registered gun to be loaded and unlocked “while it is being
used to protect against a reasonably perceived threat of immediate harm
56
to a person within the registrant's home.”
Meanwhile, in enacting these measures, the District’s government
essentially concluded that revolvers could be registered under the newly
57
amended law, but not semi-automatic pistols. This distinction stemmed
52

See District of Columbia Mayor’s Office, District Government Reacts to Heller
Ruling (2008), http://www.dc.gov/mayor/news/release.asp?id=1325&mon=200806.
53
Firearms Control Emergency Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 2(a)(1),
§ 202(a)(4), 55 D.C. Reg. 8237 (Aug. 1, 2008). The new enactment actually used the
term “pistol” rather than handgun, but pre-existing D.C. law defined the term “pistol”
to mean “any firearm originally designed to be fired by use of a single hand.” D.C.
Code § 7-2501.01(12) (2009). For a more detailed explanation of the District of
Columbia’s gun laws and their history prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller,
see Allen Rostron, Incrementalism, Comprehensive Rationality, and the Future of Gun
Control, 67 MD. L. REV. 511, 533–45 (2008).
54
Firearms Control Emergency Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 2(b), § 203(e), 55
D.C. Reg. at 8238.
55
Id. sec. 2(a)(3), § 202(c), 55 D.C. Reg. at 8237.
56
Id. sec. 2(c), § 702(3), 55 D.C. Reg. at 8238.
57
Revolvers and semi-automatic pistols are the two basic types of handguns. A
revolver has a rotating cylinder with a number of chambers (usually five or six), each
of which holds one round of ammunition. As the cylinder rotates, one chamber at a
time is aligned with the barrel so that the round in that chamber can be fired. A semiautomatic pistol instead typically has a magazine (a container that holds
ammunition) that fits inside the pistol’s grip. There are other types of handguns,
such as derringers, but they are relatively uncommon today. See generally Chuck
Hawks, Handgun Types, http://www.chuckhawks.com/handgun_types.htm.
The term “semi-automatic” refers to the means by which spent cartridge cases are
ejected from the firearm and new cartridges are loaded into the firing chamber. In
other words, when a gun fires, a bullet flies out of the barrel and heads toward the
target, but the empty cartridge case that contained the bullet is left behind in the
gun’s firing chamber and must be ejected to make room for the next round of
ammunition. For many guns (such as bolt action, lever action, slide action, or pump
action guns), this is accomplished by some sort of manual force supplied by the
shooter. See Allen Rostron, High-Powered Controversy: Gun Control, Terrorism, and the Fight
over .50 Caliber Rifles, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1415, 1419–20 (2005). Other firearms are “self-

DO NOT DELETE

396

5/14/2009 6:06 PM

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:2

from the existence of D.C. statutes which had long prohibited possession
58
of “machine gun[s].” While that term ordinarily refers only to guns
59
capable of automatic fire, District laws defined “machine gun” more
broadly to include any gun that fires semi-automatically and “which
shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily converted or restored to
60
shoot . . . more than 12 shots without manual reloading.”
This posed no problem for revolvers, most of which have an
ammunition capacity of less than twelve rounds, and almost none of
61
which are semi-automatic. Pistols, however, are a different story. In
revising its laws in response to Heller, the District of Columbia took the
position that every semi-automatic pistol constituted a “machine gun”
within the meaning of the D.C. gun laws, because it can either hold or be
readily converted to hold more than twelve rounds of ammunition. The
conversion entails simply replacing the original ammunition magazine
with a longer one capable of holding more rounds. For example, an
enormous magazine, containing many dozens of rounds of ammunition,
could be put into even a very small pistol; the magazine would just
62
extend a long way down out of the bottom of the gun’s hand grip.
The D.C. government thus concluded that semi-automatic pistols
were “machine guns” prohibited by the D.C. gun laws. Moreover,
loading,” meaning that the explosive force created by firing a round ejects the spent
cartridge from the gun, permitting the next round of ammunition to move into the
firing chamber, and thus require no action by the shooter to eject the spent round
and place a new round in the chamber. Id. at 20. A self-loading firearm is “automatic”
if it fires more than one round per trigger pull, and “semi-automatic” if it fires just
one round per trigger pull. Id.
58
See D.C. Code §§ 7-2502.02(a)(2), 22-4514(a) (2009).
59
See, e.g., Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers’ Institute, Glossary,
http://www.saami.org/glossary/display.cfm?letter=M. For a brief explanation of
“automatic” fire, see supra note 57.
60
D.C. Code § 7-2501.01(10) (2008); see also id. § 22-4501(c) (defining “machine
gun” as “any firearm which shoots automatically or semiautomatically more than
twelve shots without reloading”). These provisions were amended in September 2008.
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
61
Only a few models of semi-automatic revolvers, such as the Webley-Fosbery and
Mateba Unica, have ever been commercially produced. Neither had an ammunition
capacity of more than twelve rounds. See, e.g., World Guns, Webley-Fosbery Automatic
Revolver (Great Britain), http://world.guns.ru/handguns/hg184-e.htm; World Guns,
Mateba Model 6 Unica Auto-Revolver (Italy), http://world.guns.ru/handguns/
hg186-e.htm.
62
A pistol would not constitute a “machine gun” under District law if it had a
fixed (i.e., non-detachable) magazine that held only twelve or fewer rounds of
ammunition, or if it had some other unusual design feature that would prevent a
large-capacity magazine from being inserted into it. But such pistols are so
uncommon that the District’s position essentially amounted to saying every pistol was
a banned “machine gun.” Cf. 55 D.C. Reg. 10081 (Oct. 3, 2008) (D.C. Res. 17-771,
§ 2(d), available at http://newsroom.dc.gov/file.aspx/release/15044/03%20-%20
Resolutiions.pdf (stating that the definition of “machine gun” in D.C. statutes
“effectively prohibits the registration of most semi-automatic pistols because the
typical semi-automatic can be fitted with a large ammunition magazine”).
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according to the District, a ban on such pistols should survive a Second
Amendment challenge, even after Heller, because allowing people to
register and possess revolvers is sufficient to satisfy whatever interest in
63
self-defense people have under the Second Amendment.
Dick Heller found himself tripped up by the District of Columbia’s
response to the landmark decision that bears his name. When Heller
tried to exercise his Second Amendment rights by registering a handgun
under the newly-amended D.C. gun laws, he was turned away because the
handgun he had brought with him to the registration office was a semiautomatic pistol. When he then tried to register a revolver, his
application was again rejected because he did not have the gun with
64
him.
Not surprisingly, the District of Columbia’s positions drew strong
65
criticism from organizations like the NRA and their allies in the U.S.
66
Congress. The lawyers who brought the Heller case filed a new lawsuit
67
against the District of Columbia. In their view, the D.C. Council had
brazenly thumbed its nose at the Supreme Court and refused to comply
with the Heller decision. They condemned the District’s refusal to permit
registration of semi-automatic pistols, the most common type of handgun
used in America today, as well as the fact that the newly amended D.C.
law permitted firearms in the home to be loaded and unlocked only
when actually being used “to protect against a reasonably perceived
68
threat of immediate harm.” Under that law, the critics sarcastically
suggested, “a robber has to make an appointment with you so you can get
69
your gun ready for him.”
Before the legal merits of the D.C. Council’s initial legislative
response to Heller could be evaluated by any court, developments on the
political front dramatically changed the situation. Rather than leaving
the matter for judges to resolve, federal legislators stepped into the fray,
threatening to enact measures that would substantially weaken the

63
Del Quentin Wilber & Paul Duggan, D.C. Is Sued Again over Handgun Rules,
WASH. POST, July 29, 2008, at B1 (describing District’s acting attorney general, Peter
Nickles, as saying Supreme Court’s decision in Heller allows a government to ban a
type of firearms, such as semi-automatic pistols, that the government considers
unreasonably dangerous).
64
David C. Lipscomb & Matthew Cella, District Begins Licensing Pistols; Appeal
Victor Turned Away, WASH. TIMES, July 18, 2008, at A1.
65
David C. Lipscomb & Gary Emerling, D.C. on Verge of New Gun Law, at Risk of
Challenges; NRA Lobbyist Calls Legislation ‘a Joke,’ WASH. TIMES, July 15, 2008, at A1.
66
Editorial, Trigger-Happy on the Hill; Writing D.C. Gun Laws Isn’t Congress’s Job,
WASH. POST, July 25, 2008, at A20.
67
Wilber & Duggan, supra note 63.
68
Firearms Control Emergency Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 2(c), § 702(3), 55
D.C. Reg. 8237, 8238 (Aug. 1, 2008); see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
69
Wilber & Duggan, supra note 63 (quoting Stephen P. Halbrook, an attorney for
Dick Heller).
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District’s gun laws and strip the District’s local government of authority to
70
enact new restrictions.
Hoping to defuse the congressional threat and to preserve its local
control over gun issues, the District government quickly backpedaled and
71
enacted more legislation. Responding to the sharpest criticisms of its
initial response to Heller, the D.C. Council relaxed the restrictions on
semi-automatic firearms and the requirements for storage of guns.
Specifically, the new law revised the definition of “machine gun” to
maintain a ban on automatic weapons but to permit registration of semi72
automatic pistols and rifles with magazines holding ten or fewer rounds.
The revised law also allowed a person to register and own multiple
handguns, although it provided that only one handgun could be
73
registered by a person during any thirty day period, effectively imposing
74
a “one handgun a month” rule like those in effect in several states. As
for storage of guns, the revised law permitted a person to keep a
registered gun loaded and ready to use for defense in the person’s home
if carried “on his person or within such close proximity that he can

70
In September 2008, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill that would
drastically cut back legal restrictions on guns in the District of Columbia. 154 CONG.
REC. H8285 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008) (voting 266 to 152 in favor of the Second
Amendment Enforcement Act, H.R. 6842, 110th Cong. (2008)). The U.S. Senate,
however, did not act on the bill. See Mary Beth Sheridan, Limit on Gun Law Passes;
Senate Vote Unlikely, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2008, at B2 (describing moves to block the
bill in the Senate).
Early in the next term of Congress, the U.S. Senate approved a measure very
similar to what the House of Representatives had passed in September 2008. See 155
CONG. REC. S2538 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2009) (voting 62 to 36 in favor of Amendment
No. 575 to the District of Columbia Voting Rights Act of 2009, S. 160, 111th Cong.
(2009)). The Senate measure was passed as an amendment to a bill that would give
the District of Columbia a voting member in the U.S. House of Representatives,
forcing D.C. officials and Democratic leaders in Congress to make a difficult choice
between continuing to push for D.C. voting rights or fighting to preserve the
District’s gun laws. See Michael E. Ruane & Mary Beth Sheridan, D.C. Weighs Price of
Securing Vote in Congress; Gun Law Compromise May Be Unavoidable to Pass Bill, WASH.
POST, Mar. 21, 2009, at A1. At the moment, as this Article is being finalized for
publication, it remains uncertain how this showdown in Congress will be resolved. See
Nikita Stewart, Gun Amendment Assailed at Capitol Hill Rally, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 2009,
at B4.
71
Responding to the pressure from Congress, the District passed the Second
Firearms Control Emergency Amendment Act of 2008, 55 D.C. Reg. 9904 (Sept. 26,
2008). This was a temporary “emergency” measure, effective for only ninety days. Id.
§ 7. It was renewed by the Second Firearms Control Congressional Review Emergency
Amendment Act of 2008, 56 D.C. Reg. 9 (Jan. 12, 2009), and then superseded by a
regular (i.e., non-emergency) enactment, the Firearms Registration Amendment Act
of 2008, 56 D.C. Reg. 1365 (Feb. 13, 2009).
72
Second Firearms Control Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act
of 2008, sec. 2(a)–(b), (d), §§ 101(10), 202(a)(4), 601(b), 56 D.C. Reg. at 9–10.
73
Id. sec. 2(c), § 203(e), 56 D.C. at 10.
74
E.g., MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-128 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2308.2:2(P) (2008); see Rostron, supra note 53, at 544.

DO NOT DELETE

2009]

5/14/2009 6:06 PM

GUN RIGHTS AND GUN CONTROL AFTER HELLER

399

75

readily retrieve and use it as if he carried it on his person.” The revised
law made it a crime to store a gun in a way that permits a minor to gain
76
unauthorized access to it.
While the D.C. Council relaxed restrictions on guns in those
respects, it tightened them in many other ways. Among other things, the
Council extended the waiting period for handgun purchases from two
77
days to ten days, updated and strengthened the District’s ban on assault
78
79
weapons, added a new ban on certain extremely high-powered rifles,
80
adopted California’s strict safety and testing standards for handguns,
and copied California’s demand that gun makers soon begin equipping
pistols with “microstamping” technology to help police solve crimes when
81
they recover cartridge cases left behind at the scenes of shootings. The
D.C. Council also imposed new requirements on District residents
registering guns, such as requiring each applicant to complete a five-hour
82
training course, requiring registration certificates to be renewed every
83
three years, and requiring registered gun owners to undergo a
84
background check every six years.
Political pressure from Congress thus forced the D.C. government to
go beyond its initial, very limited response to the Heller ruling. As a result,
the constitutionality of the D.C. Council’s initial response to Heller will
75

Second Firearms Control Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act
of 2008, sec. 2(e), § 702(b), 56 D.C. Reg. at 11.
76
Id.
77
Inoperable Pistol Emergency Amendment Act of 2008, sec. 2(g), § 8, 56 D.C.
Reg. 927, 929–30 (Jan. 30, 2009).
78
Firearms Registration Amendment Act of 2008, sec. 3(a)(1), § 101 ¶ 3A, 56
D.C. Reg. 1366 (Feb. 13, 2009).
79
The District banned .50 BMG rifles as well as other rifles “capable of firing a
projectile that attains a muzzle energy of 12,000 foot-pounds or greater in any
combination of bullet, propellant, case, or primer.” Id. sec. 3(a)(2), § 101 ¶ 8A, 56
D.C. Reg. at 1369–70. For the inspiration for that measure, see Rostron, supra note
57, at 1461–65.
80
As of January 1, 2009, only handguns on the “California Roster of Handguns
Certified for Sale” can be sold or registered in the District. Second Firearms Control
Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2008, sec. 3(m), § 504(a), 56
D.C. Reg. at 1377.
81
“Microstamping” means that a pistol, when fired, will imprint a number or
other identifying code on cartridge cases. The cartridge cases are ejected from the
gun as it fires and may be left scattered on the ground at crime scenes. If police
recover a cartridge case with a microstamped code on it, they can use the code to
determine what gun was used to commit the crime. See David Muradyan, Firearm
Microstamping: A “Bullet with a Name on It,” 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 616, 625 (2008). The
District’s “microstamping” requirement takes effect on January 1, 2011, while
California’s similar requirement takes effect one year earlier. See Second Firearms
Control Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act of 2008, sec. 3(l), §
408(b), 56 D.C. Reg. at 1375.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 12126(b)(7) (West 2009).
82
Second Firearms Control Congressional Review Emergency Amendment Act
of 2008, sec. 3(d)(1)(E), § 203(a) ¶ 13, 56 D.C. Reg. at 1372.
83
Id. sec. 3(g), § 207a, 56 D.C. Reg. at 1373.
84
Id.

DO NOT DELETE

400

5/14/2009 6:06 PM

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:2

never be tested in court. If courts had decided the matter, the D.C.
government may well have prevailed, for every aspect of its initial
response to the Heller decision was based on very plausible readings of
the Supreme Court’s majority opinion. Although Justice Scalia concluded
that handguns have constitutionally-significant advantages over long guns
85
for purposes of defending against criminals, his opinion did not say
anything about the relative merits of revolvers versus semi-automatic
pistols. Justice Scalia’s opinion did say that the Second Amendment
86
extends only to firearms that are in “common use” today, and pistols
obviously satisfy that criterion so they do not fall completely outside the
scope of the right to keep and bear arms. But that merely begins the
inquiry, and does not necessarily mean a ban on pistols violates the
Second Amendment. The District of Columbia certainly could make a
credible argument that a new law banning pistols but permitting
revolvers would impair its residents’ ability to defend themselves against
criminals far less than the old law, found unconstitutional in Heller, which
banned all handguns.
The issue would be a very tough one to resolve on the basis of
“historical” evidence, despite Scalia’s insistence that looking back at how
guns were regulated in the olden days is the best way to decide these sorts
87
of questions today. Revolvers were virtually unknown in America until
88
legendary gun maker Samuel Colt began producing them in 1836.
Semi-automatic pistols would not appear until more than fifty years
89
later. Obviously no one had any thoughts about the relative virtues of
revolvers and pistols in the founding era, nor would anyone for a century
after the Second Amendment’s adoption.
Of course, the lack of any original understanding or early America
historical tradition concerning the issue of revolvers versus pistols would
not necessarily stop Justice Scalia. After all, his assertions in Heller about
the importance of handguns versus long guns did not really depend on
historical evidence. Instead, Scalia simply relied on his own beliefs about
handguns being preferable for people with little upper body strength,
90
easier to hold while dialing a telephone, and so on.
If judges undertake the same sort of free-ranging public policy
inquiry about revolvers and semi-automatic pistols, what are they likely to
91
find? Revolvers are generally considered to be a bit more durable and
85

District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2818 (2008); see supra notes 14–
16 and accompanying text.
86
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2815, 2817.
87
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
88
Colt’s Manufacturing Company, Inc., Colt History, http://www.coltsmfg.com
/cmci/history.asp.
89
See WALTER H.B. SMITH, THE BOOK OF PISTOLS & REVOLVERS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIC
REFERENCE WORK 25–26 (5th ed. 1962).
90
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818; see supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
91
The general observations about revolvers and pistols in this paragraph are not
based on any one particular source, and instead reflect basic conventional wisdom
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reliable than pistols, require less training and experience to handle
safely, and are slightly easier to load and unload (for example, requiring
less manual dexterity and strength). The most powerful handguns, such
as the .44 Magnum and .50 Magnum, are revolvers. Revolvers also are, as
a very general matter, less expensive. On the other hand, pistols typically
have a greater ammunition capacity and can be loaded more quickly
than revolvers, although speedloader devices for revolvers cut the loading
time gap considerably by allowing all chambers of a revolver to be loaded
simultaneously instead of one at a time. Many pistols have manual safeties
(a switch that can be put in a position that deactivates the gun), but
revolvers typically do not. Pistols also can be flatter in shape (because
they do not have the relatively wide cylinder required for a revolver), so
they can be easier to carry concealed.
Given all that, would it violate the Second Amendment for the
District of Columbia, or some other jurisdiction, to prohibit pistols while
allowing possession of revolvers for home defense? Courts could easily go
either way on this sort of fact-intensive, subjective decision-making about
the relative merits of various guns. Indeed, it certainly seems like the sort
of issue on which courts do not have any particular expertise, but it is
exactly the sort of judicial micromanagement of gun policymaking to
which Heller opened the door. In my view, the District of Columbia at
least had very plausible arguments that a statutory preference for
revolvers over pistols would yield some slight public or personal safety
benefits without materially infringing on anyone’s constitutional interest
in keeping and bearing arms for defensive purposes. For example, the
fact that pistols are generally easier to conceal weighs against them in this
analysis because the District of Columbia still does not permit people to
92
carry concealed guns in public, and the Supreme Court has strongly
93
hinted that such a law is constitutional.
The District also had a reasonable argument for the gun storage
provision of its initial legislative response to Heller. As explained above,
about the relative merits of each type of handgun. For a few typical examples of
discussion of these sorts of considerations, see L.R. WALLACK, AMERICAN PISTOL &
REVOLVER DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE 23–24 (1978); RUPERTO ELPUSAN, JR., WOMEN’S
GUIDE TO BUYING YOUR FIRST HANDGUN ch. 5 (2006), available at
http://www.besafeguntraining.com/womens-first-handgun-buy/ch5-revolver-vs-semiautomaticpistol.htm; Mark Freburg, FirearmsForum.com on Outdoors Network, Revolvers and
Semi-Automatic Pistols: A Primer for Beginners, http://www.outdoors.net/site/features/
feature.aspx+Forum+Firearms+ArticleCode+2619+V+N+SearchTerm++curpage+2619;
InternetArmory.com, Selection of a Handgun for Self Defense, http://www.internetarmory.com/
handgun_defense.htm; PistolProwess.com, Choosing a Pistol: What Gun Should I Buy?,
http://www.pistolprowess.com/Choosing_a_Pistol.htm.
92
D.C. CODE § 22-4504(a) (2009); see Rostron, supra 53, at 536 (summarizing
history of ban on concealed weapons in District of Columbia).
93
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816 (noting that “the majority of the 19th-century courts
to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were
lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues”); see supra notes 8–9 and
accompanying text.
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the D.C. Council initially opted to maintain the requirement that guns be
kept unloaded and disassembled or locked, but created an exception for
circumstances where the gun was being used in response to a “perceived
94
threat of immediate harm.” That provision, imposing a safe-storage
requirement but with a limited self-defense exception, seems to be
exactly what the majority opinion in Heller suggested would be sufficient
95
to satisfy the Constitution. In the Heller litigation, the District argued
that its statute on storage of guns already implicitly contained an
96
exception for self-defense. The Supreme Court rejected that attempted
concession, saying that it was not supported by the D.C. statute’s explicit
97
language. The Supreme Court thus condemned the D.C. law for “its
prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable
98
for the purpose of immediate self-defense,” while emphasizing that its
ruling should not be read as “suggest[ing] the invalidity of laws
99
regulating the storage of firearms to prevent accidents.” In other words,
the Supreme Court made clear that governments can require guns to be
stored safely, but must permit people to unlock and use their guns when
faced with an immediate need for defensive use. In its initial response to
Heller, the District of Columbia amended its statute to do exactly what the
Supreme Court required, even phrasing the exception with the same
“immediate” threat language suggested by the Court.
Again, the District of Columbia’s eventual capitulation to
congressional pressure means that the validity of the D.C. Council’s
initial post-Heller enactments will never be tested in court. If courts had
the opportunity to decide the matter, I believe the District’s initial
response to Heller may well have survived constitutional attack. That is not
to say that the D.C. Council’s initial response to Heller constituted an
ideal approach to firearm regulation. If I were a legislator, I would not
draw a distinction between revolvers and pistols as the D.C. Council
100
initially tried to do. I also would not favor the sort of rigid law on gun
storage that the D.C. Council initially enacted in response to Heller, and
instead I would support the more flexible sort of “child access
101
prevention” law that the D.C. Council eventually adopted. That law,
102
like the similar statutes in force in a number of other states, properly
focuses on the ultimate concern, whether the gun owner acts responsibly
94
Firearms Control Emergency Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 2(c), § 702(3), 55
D.C. Reg. 8237, 8238 (Aug. 1, 2008); see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
95
See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 n.26, 2821–22.
96
See Brief for Petitioners at 56, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783
(2008) (No. 07-290).
97
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818.
98
Id. at 2822.
99
Id. at 2820.
100
See supra note 58–59 and accompanying text.
101
See supra note 75–76 and accompanying text.
102
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-104(c) (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5815(a) (West 2008); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.13 (Vernon 2008).
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under the circumstances to prevent children from gaining unauthorized
access to the weapon, without prescribing a specific rule about exactly
103
how that goal must be achieved in every situation.
I therefore do not particularly like the D.C. Council’s initial response
to Heller. But I am not a legislator for the District of Columbia, and
neither is Antonin Scalia or any other member of his Court. The D.C.
104
Council, with oversight from the U.S. Congress, has the job of making
these sorts of policy decisions for the District of Columbia, and its choices
should be respected by courts unless they violate the Constitution. The
District of Columbia’s initial legislative response to Heller consisted of
only very modest changes to its gun laws. That is not because the District
ignored the Supreme Court’s ruling; it is because the Supreme Court did
not require more. If that surprised Dick Heller and his allies, that is
because their victory in the constitutional litigation was not as sweeping
as they initially may have imagined it to be. The District’s gun laws
ultimately have been changed more substantially than the D.C. Council
initially hoped, but that outcome is the result of political pressure from
Congress rather than anything the Supreme Court actually said in Heller.
B. Lower Courts’ Initial Reactions to Heller

Heller also prompted a flurry of rulings in lower courts around the
country on constitutional challenges brought against various gun laws.
These early decisions give only a very preliminary, tentative sense of how
the caselaw will develop and the effect that Heller ultimately will have. To
the extent they give any signals about the future, however, they suggest
that Heller’s impact will be limited.
Virtually all of the early rulings that discuss Heller have come in
criminal cases, with defendants raising Second Amendment arguments in
an effort to overturn indictments or convictions for violating firearm
laws. Courts have upheld almost all of the challenged statutes, usually
with little difficulty or discussion. Many of the cases have involved the
sorts of gun laws that the Supreme Court in Heller deemed to be
105
presumptively valid. For example, following Heller’s clear cue, lower
courts have unanimously upheld federal laws prohibiting convicted
106
felons from possessing firearms. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s

103

See generally Andrew J. McClurg, Child Access Prevention Laws: A Common Sense
Approach to Gun Control, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 47 (1999).
104
Congress has granted home rule authority to the District of Columbia, but
retains the power to review the D.C. Council’s enactments and to pass resolutions
overruling them. District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental
Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, §§ 401–04, 602(c), 87 Stat. 774, 785–88, 814
(1973).
105
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17.
106
E.g., United States v. Brye, No. 08-12578, 2009 WL 637553, at *1 (11th Cir.
Mar. 13, 2009); United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 348 (5th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Brunson, 292 F. App’x 259, 261 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Gilbert, 286
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suggestion that firearms can be prohibited in “sensitive places such as
107
lower courts have rejected
schools and government buildings,”
challenges to criminal charges for possessing a firearm within 1,000 feet
108
109
110
of a school, on U.S. Postal Service property, or at an airport. In
keeping with the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the Second
Amendment protects only weapons in “common use” today, lower courts
have rejected challenges to laws imposing special restrictions on
111
112
sawed-off shotguns,
and
possession of automatic weapons,
113
silencers. Citing the Supreme Court’s statement in Heller about most
nineteenth-century courts upholding bans on carrying concealed
114
weapons, courts have concluded that a state may prohibit carrying a
115
concealed gun in public without a permit.
Those rulings, strongly foreshadowed by Heller, are not surprising.
They raise the sorts of issues that should be easy for courts and that are
likely to be decided unanimously in favor of upholding gun laws against
Second Amendment attacks. The harder cases will be those in which

F. App’x 383, 386 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Irish, 285 F. App’x 326, 327 (8th
Cir. 2008); see also United States v. McRobie, No. 08-4632, 2009 WL 82715, at *1 (4th
Cir. Jan. 14, 2009) (upholding federal law prohibiting possession of gun by person
committed to mental institution); United States v. Solis-Gonzalez, No. 3:08-CR-145MR-DCK-1, 2008 WL 4539663, at *2–3 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 26, 2008) (upholding federal
law prohibiting possession of gun by illegal alien); State v. Hunter, 195 P.3d 556, 562–
64 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (upholding ban on possession of gun by person convicted
of felony while a juvenile).
107
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817.
108
United States v. Walters, No. 2008-31, 2008 WL 2740398 at *1 (D.V.I. July 15,
2008).
109
United States v. Dorosan, No. 08-042, 2009 WL 273300, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 28,
2009).
110
United States v. Davis, No. 05-50726, 2008 WL 4962926, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 21,
2008); People v. Ferguson, No. 2008QN036911, 2008 WL 4694552, at *4 (N.Y. Crim.
Ct. Queens County Oct. 24, 2008); cf. Georgiacarry.org, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, No. 0815571, 2009 WL 614778, at *1 (11th Cir. Mar. 12, 2009) (rejecting claim that ban on
guns in Atlanta airport violated Georgia).
111
E.g., United States v. Ross, No. 08-1120, 2009 WL 1111544, at *2 (3d Cir. Apr.
27, 2009); United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Gilbert, 286 F. App’x 383, 386 (9th Cir. 2008); Salter v. Roy, No.5:08-CV-145, 2008 WL
4588629, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2008); United States v. Garnett, No. 05-CR-20002-3,
2008 WL 2796098, at *4 (E.D. Mich. July 18, 2008).
112
United States v. Artez, 290 F. App’x 203, 208 (10th Cir. 2008); Fincher, 538 F.3d
at 870; Gilbert, 286 F. App’x at 386.
113
United States v. Perkins, No. 4:08CR3064, 2008 WL 4372821, at *4 (D. Neb.
Sept. 23, 2008); Garnett, 2008 WL 2796098, at *4.
114
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816 (2008).
115
E.g., Young v. Hawaii, No. 08-00540 DAE-KSC, 2009 WL 874517, at *5 (D. Haw.
Apr. 1, 2009); Swait v. University of Nebraska at Omaha, No. 8:08CV404, 2008 WL
5083245, at *3 (D. Neb. Nov. 25, 2008); United States v. Hall, No. 2:08-00006, 2008
WL 3097558, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 4, 2008); People v. Flores, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804,
807–08 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); People v. Yarbrough, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 674, 682–83 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2008).
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courts face challenges to gun laws that go beyond the types of regulations
specifically blessed by Heller.
For example, gun rights advocates have complained bitterly about
New York City’s licensing system, which requires all gun owners to obtain
a permit through a process that critics say is too long, complex, arbitrary,
116
and costly. Courts nevertheless have rejected challenges to the New
York City laws, even where the defendant possessed the firearm in his
home and was not engaged in any criminal activity other than not having
117
a license for the firearm. Although the New York City laws may be very
restrictive, they do not amount to “a complete ban on the possession of
handguns in the home” and therefore they do not violate Second
118
Amendment rights under Heller.
Another hotly contested question will be the validity of the federal
law that prohibits possession of a gun by a person who has been
119
That
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.
provision, enacted in 1996 and commonly referred to as the “Lautenberg
120
amendment,” has been loudly criticized by many gun rights advocates,
particularly for disqualifying people with domestic violence misdemeanor
convictions from doing law enforcement or military work that requires
121
carrying a gun. On this issue, the Heller opinion could be read as giving
hints in either direction. Heller specifically referred to the presumptive
validity of “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
122
felons and the mentally ill,” without mentioning any of the other
categories of people barred by federal law from possessing guns—
including domestic violence misdemeanants, drug addicts, people who
have renounced their U.S. citizenship, or those dishonorably discharged
116

Joseph Goldstein, Gun Rights of New Yorkers May Rest on Case of Hot Dog Vendor,
N.Y. SUN, Aug. 1, 2008, at 1.
117
E.g., People v. Abdullah, 870 N.Y.S.2d 886, 887 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Kings County
Dec. 30, 2008).
118
Id. at 887. Most courts seem similarly inclined to read Heller as applying only to
a person’s possession of guns within his or her home. See, e.g., Minotti v. Whitehead,
584 F. Supp. 2d 750, 760 (D. Md. 2008); Sims v. United States, 963 A.2d 147, 150
(D.C. 2008); Brook v. State, 999 So. 2d 1093, 1094–95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). But
cf. Lund v. Salt Lake City Corp., Civil No. 2:07-CV-0226BSJ, 2008 WL 5119875, at *7
n.9 (D. Utah Dec. 4, 2008) (suggesting that “mere possession of a firearm in public
. . . may well represent the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right guaranteed
by the Second Amendment”).
119
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006).
120
The provision was enacted in 1996 as part of the Omnibus Consolidated
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 658, 110 Stat. 3009, 3309–371 (1996).
121
See Jodi L. Nelson, Note, The Lautenberg Amendment: An Essential Tool for
Combating Domestic Violence, 75 N.D. L. REV. 365, 366–68 (1999). Federal law also bans
possession of guns by a person subject to a domestic violence restraining order, 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2006), although that provision does not affect law enforcement
or military personnel possessing guns as part of their job duties, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 925(a)(1) (2006) (providing exception to certain federal firearm laws for
governments).
122
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816–17 (2008).
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123

from the U.S. military.
The explicit mention of felons, but not
misdemeanants, could be taken as a signal that the ban on guns for the
latter group poses greater constitutional difficulties. On the other hand,
the Heller opinion noted that it was not trying to provide an exhaustive
list of all presumptively valid gun laws, and the reference to “felons and
the mentally ill” may have been simply a shorthand way of referring to all
the restrictions on access to guns for categories of people posing special
124
dangers.
So far, the courts that have faced this issue have ruled in favor of the
government, upholding the Lautenberg amendment’s ban on guns for
125
The federal
people convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors.
district court in Maine provided a particularly cogent analysis, in United
States v. Booker, noting first that the Supreme Court in Heller strongly
suggested that banning guns for felons is permissible, and then reasoning
that the ban for domestic violence misdemeanants is actually even more
tightly tailored to the strong government interest in preventing gun
126
violence. While the ban on guns for felons applies to all sorts of
offenses, violent and non-violent, the Lautenberg amendment applies
only to misdemeanors that actually involve use or attempted use of
127
violence. Other courts have undertaken a similar analysis in upholding
the federal law that prohibits possession of a gun by a person who is the
128
subject of a domestic violence restraining order. These early decisions
are a positive sign, albeit only a preliminary and tentative one, about how
Heller will play out in the lower courts.
One of the key uncertainties after Heller is what test or standard of
scrutiny will be applied in Second Amendment cases. The Supreme
Court in Heller declined to say, other than to make clear that it would not
129
be mere rational basis scrutiny. So far, only a few reported decisions by
lower courts have ventured answers. Most have concluded that
intermediate scrutiny should apply to laws restricting the right to keep
123

See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006).
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 n.26.
125
United States v. Li, No. 08-CR-212, 2008 WL 4610318, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 15,
2008); United States v. Chester, No.2:08-00105, 2008 WL 4534210, at *2 (S.D. W. Va.
Oct. 7, 2008); United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 162–65 (D. Me. 2008);
United States v. White, No. 07-00361-WS, 2008 WL 3211298, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 6,
2008); see also People v. Flores, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804, 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(upholding California law prohibiting possession of guns by person convicted of
misdemeanor assault).
126
Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 163–64.
127
Id. at 164–65.
128
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2006); United States v. Montalvo, No. 08-CR-004S,
2009 WL 667229, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2009); United States v. Luedtke, 589 F.
Supp. 2d 1018, 1021–23 (E.D. Wis. 2008); United States v. Lippman, No. 4:02-cr-082,
2008 WL 4661514, at *3 (D.N.D. Oct. 20, 2008); United States v. Erwin, No. 1:07-CR556 (LEK), 2008 WL 4534058, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2008); United States v. Knight,
574 F. Supp. 2d 224, 225–27 (D. Me. 2008).
129
See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817–18, 2818 n.27.
124
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and bear arms, requiring the legislation to be substantially related to an
130
important government objective. In these cases, the courts have gone
on to find that the challenged laws easily survived the intermediate
scrutiny analysis. For example, in rejecting a challenge to the federal law
requiring a person to be 21 years old to buy a handgun from a licensed
firearms dealer, a judge simply noted that statistics show “the vast
majority of guns confiscated from 18–20 year old criminal defendants are
131
handguns.” That was enough, the judge thought, to show a substantial
government interest served by the challenged statute. Thus, the court not
only steered toward an intermediate scrutiny test rather than adopting
strict scrutiny, but also applied the intermediate scrutiny formula in a
relatively undemanding way that suggests virtually all existing legal
restrictions on guns should be upheld because they reasonably aim to
achieve an interest in preventing crimes, deaths, and injuries.
Applying that sort of test, focused on the reasonableness of gun
regulations, would be consistent with the approach taken by the many
courts that, even before Heller, discussed and applied a constitutional
right to keep and bear arms for purposes unrelated to organized military
activity. Prof. Adam Winkler has described how courts in many states have
long held that their citizens have a right under their state constitutions to
132
keep and bear arms for non-military purposes. In this robust line of
precedent, comprising hundreds of cases involving challenges to a wide
133
array of gun laws, there is an overwhelming consensus that government
134
restrictions on guns are valid if they are “reasonable regulations.”
According to Winkler’s review of the decisions, this is an extremely
deferential standard “under which nearly all gun control laws would
135
survive judicial scrutiny.” No state applied strict scrutiny or any sort of
136
similarly heightened review. Although this “reasonable regulations” test
is very deferential, it is not entirely toothless, it is not the same as mere
rational basis scrutiny, and courts have used it to strike down laws “found
130
E.g., United States v. Miller, No. 08-CR-10097, 2009 WL 499111, at *6 (W.D.
Tenn. Feb. 26, 2009); United States v. Radencich, 3:08-CR-00048(01)RM, 2009 WL
127648, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 20, 2009); United States v. Marzzarella, No. 07-24 Erie,
2009 WL 90395, at *7–*9 (W.D. Penn. Jan. 14, 2009); United States v. Schultz, No.
1:08-CR-75-TS, 2009 WL 35225, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009); United States v.
Bledsoe, No. SA-08-CR-13(2)-XR, 2008 WL 3538717, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2008).
But see United States v. Engstrum, No. 2:08-CR-430 TS, 2009 WL 975286, at *3 (D.
Utah Apr. 10, 2009) (applying strict scrutiny but upholding indictment under federal
law banning possession of firearm by person with a past conviction for a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence).
131
Bledsoe, 2008 WL 3538717, at *4.
132
See Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683,
686 (2007).
133
Adam Winkler, The Reasonable Right to Bear Arms, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 597,
598 (2006).
134
Winkler, supra note 132, at 686, 706; Winkler, supra note 133, at 598.
135
Winkler, supra note 132, at 686.
136
Id. at 686–87.

DO NOT DELETE

408

5/14/2009 6:06 PM

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:2

to be arbitrary or to amount to a complete denial of the right to bear
137
arms.” The U.S. Supreme Court could have provided valuable direction
in Heller by endorsing and using the “reasonable regulations” approach
138
to invalidate the challenged provisions of District of Columbia law.
Although Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller did not do that, and instead
left the standard of review uncertain, I believe the lower court decisions
will head in the direction of a suitably deferential test like the
“reasonable regulations” standard so widely embraced under state
139
constitutions for many years. Since the Heller decision, several state
courts have already suggested that the “reasonable regulation” test
should continue to apply, implying that it is consistent with what the U.S.
140
Supreme Court said and did in Heller.
The same conclusion finds support in the cases decided by federal
courts in the Fifth Circuit over the seven years prior to the Heller decision.
Those courts had a head start on grappling with the issues raised by
interpreting the Second Amendment to extend to non-military
possession and use of guns, because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in 2001 adopted that view of the Second Amendment in
United States v. Emerson, the case that created the first crack in the
previously uniform judicial consensus on a narrow interpretation of the
141
Amendment’s reach.
Although the Emerson decision was certainly a dramatic development
in Second Amendment jurisprudence and a key precursor of Heller, the
practical impact of Emerson on gun laws within the Fifth Circuit was
decidedly minimal. In Emerson itself, Fifth Circuit judges decided that the
Second Amendment provides a right to keep and bear arms for nonmilitary purposes, but then emphasized that this right is subject to
142
reasonable regulations, and held that the federal ban on possession of
143
guns by people subject to domestic violence restraining orders is valid.
Not a single gun law was ever struck down as unconstitutional under
Emerson. Instead, Fifth Circuit courts rejected every Second Amendment

137

Winkler, supra note 133, at 598.
Winkler and Erwin Chemerinsky filed an amici brief in the Heller case. Brief of
Law Professors Erwin Chemerinsky and Adam Winkler as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290).
139
See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. City of Philadelphia, No. 1472, 2008 WL 3819269, at n.6
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. July 1, 2008).
140
See id.; State v. Rosch, No. 59703-5-I, 2008 WL 4120052, at *4–*5 (Wash. Ct.
App. Sept. 8, 2008).
141
United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
142
Id. at 261 (“Although, as we have held, the Second Amendment does protect
individual rights, that does not mean that those rights may never be made subject to
any limited, narrowly tailored specific exceptions or restrictions for particular cases
that are reasonable and not inconsistent with the right of Americans generally to
individually keep and bear their private arms as historically understood in this
country.”).
143
Id. at 261–64.
138
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144

argument presented to them, while holding that the right to keep and
bear arms is not a fundamental right and it does not make restrictions on
145
firearms subject to strict scrutiny. The Fifth Circuit’s experience under
Emerson is a strong indication of what courts across the nation are likely to
do under Heller; it suggests that the Second Amendment will be a very
broad right, but not a particularly strong one.
Indeed, in the first ten months after the Supreme Court’s decision in
Heller, courts have resolved only a few minor issues in the direction of
greater gun rights rather than gun control. The most prominent
examples involve the pretrial release conditions imposed on defendants
charged with child pornography offenses. In the “Adam Walsh”
provisions added to federal law in 2006, Congress provided a mandatory
list of conditions for courts to impose on a defendant released on bail to
await trial on child pornography offenses, including that the defendant
146
“refrain from possessing a firearm.” Citing Heller, two federal courts
have concluded that this restriction on access to firearms cannot be
imposed automatically, and instead an individualized determination must
be made as to whether the circumstances warrant restriction of the
147
defendant’s right to have firearms. These rulings, giving defendants in
child pornography cases a chance to argue why they should be allowed to
have guns while out on bail, represent the biggest “victory” to date for
gun rights under Heller.
In a few other cases, Heller has influenced lower courts’ analysis of
various legal issues, but without resulting in any law being found to

144

See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 431 F.3d 832, 835–36 (5th Cir. 2005)
(rejecting Second Amendment challenge to federal ban on guns for unlawful drug
users or addicts); United States v. Everist, 368 F.3d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2004) (rejecting
Second Amendment challenge to federal ban on guns for convicted felons); United
States v. Woods, 37 F. App’x 712, 712(5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting Second Amendment
challenge to federal ban on guns for people convicted of domestic violence
misdemeanors); Hunter v. City of Electra, No. 7:03-CV-153-R, 2006 WL 1814150, at *2
(N.D. Tex. June 29, 2006) (rejecting Second Amendment challenge to confiscation of
firearm during arrest); Dickerson v. City of Denton, 298 F. Supp. 2d 537, 540–41 (E.D.
Tex. 2004) (rejecting Second Amendment challenge to seizure of firearm during
search of business premises).
145
See, e.g., United States v. Darrington, 351 F.3d 632, 635 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Again,
Emerson is a carefully and laboriously crafted opinion, and if it intended to recognize
that the individual right to keep and bear arms is a ‘fundamental right,’ in the sense
that restrictions on this right are subject to ‘strict scrutiny’ by the courts and require a
‘compelling state interest,’ it would have used these constitutional terms of art.”).
Only two of fourteen Fifth Circuit judges took the position that strict scrutiny should
apply to Second Amendment claims under Emerson. See United States v. Herrera, 313
F.3d 882, 888 (5th Cir. 2002) (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
146
18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(viii) (2006).
147
United States v. Kennedy, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1230 n.4 (W.D. Wash. 2008),
motion to revoke order denied, 593 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (W.D. Wash. 2009); United States v.
Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 601–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

DO NOT DELETE

410

5/14/2009 6:06 PM

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:2

148

violate the Second Amendment. For example, in a case in federal court
in Pennsylvania, William Kitsch faced charges of illegally possessing
eleven firearms, thousands of rounds of ammunition, and body armor
149
despite being a convicted felon. Kitsch claimed that he truly and
reasonably believed he did not have a felony criminal record, because law
enforcement agents had told him that they would expunge a conviction
from his record, and he thereafter passed a criminal background check
150
when he started purchasing guns. Rather than challenging the validity
of the law banning felons from having guns, Kitsch instead raised a
question of statutory interpretation. To obtain a conviction, prosecutors
151
had to prove that Kitsch “knowingly” violated federal gun laws. In the
prosecution’s view, this merely required proof that Kitsch knew he had a
gun, but Kitsch insisted that it also required proof that he knew he had a
152
A federal district court judge agreed with
felony criminal record.
Kitsch’s interpretation of the statute. The judge stated that he would have
decided the issue the same way before Heller, but noted that Heller did
153
add some additional weight in favor of Kitsch’s interpretation. In other
words, punishing a felon for possessing a gun, even if he reasonably
believed in good faith that he was not a felon, would “at the very least,
raise constitutional doubts,” and so accepting Kitsch’s interpretation of
the statute’s scienter requirement had the “added benefit of avoiding
154
potential doubts post-Heller about the statute’s constitutionality.” Again,
this could be scored as a win for gun rights under Heller, but it is a ruling
of fairly minor consequence, determining only the scope of the mens rea
requirement of a criminal statute rather than the statute’s
constitutionality.
The U.S. Supreme Court recently had a similar opportunity for Heller
to influence its interpretation of a federal firearm statute. In United States
155
v. Hayes, the Court considered whether the federal statute prohibiting
148

See, e.g., Jennings v. Mukasey, No. 6:08-cv-833-Orl-31GJK, 2008 WL 4371348, at
*2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2008) (finding that plaintiff was entitled to have court
determine whether he was legally permitted to have firearms after expungement of
conviction for domestic violence misdemeanor); City of Cleveland v. Fulton, 898
N.E.2d 983, 989 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (requiring police to return confiscated
handgun to person who was acquitted of charges of using weapons while intoxicated
and endangering children); Simmons v. Gillespie, No. 08-CV-1068, 2008 WL 3925157,
at *2 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2008) (declining to dismiss claim that police chief violated
police officer’s rights by issuing memorandum prohibiting officer from possessing or
carrying firearms, on or off duty, without the chief’s prior authorization), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 08-CV-1068, 2008 WL 3876145 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2008).
149
See United States v. Kitsch, No. 03-594-01, 2008 WL 2971548, at *1, *2 & n.4
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2008).
150
Id. at *1.
151
Id. at *2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 942(a)(2) (2006)).
152
Id. at *2.
153
Id. at *7.
154
Id.
155
United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079 (2009).
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possession of a gun by a person convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of
156
domestic violence” applies only where proof of a domestic relationship
between offender and victim was actually a required element of the
misdemeanor offense, or instead reaches more broadly to situations
where a person was convicted of battery against a spouse but was
prosecuted under a “general battery” statute rather than one specifically
addressing domestic violence. The Court adopted the broader
interpretation favored by federal prosecutors and gun control
157
advocates. Never mentioning Heller or the Second Amendment, the
Court instead emphasized the need to achieve Congress’s purpose of
keeping guns out of the hands of domestic abusers. “Firearms and
domestic strife,” the Court observed, “are a potentially deadly
158
combination nationwide.” Although the constitutionality of the statute
was not an issue directly before the Court in that case, the Court easily
could have taken Second Amendment interests into account in
interpreting the statute if it were inclined to do so. The Court obviously
was not, and its opinion certainly does not read like the work of judges
poised to start invalidating gun control laws, like the one banning
possession of guns by those with misdemeanor domestic violence
convictions.
The future of Second Amendment jurisprudence remains very much
an open question. Heller generated a slew of significant questions that
have not yet been clearly answered, from the standard of scrutiny that will
be applied in Second Amendment cases to whether the right to keep and
bear arms will be held applicable to state and local governments through
the Fourteenth Amendment. But to the extent that developments since
Heller provide clues, they point consistently toward the conclusion that
Heller’s impact will be limited and only the most extraordinarily restrictive
gun laws should be struck down.
IV. HELLER’S IMPACT ON THE NATIONAL DEBATE OVER GUNS

The most important consequences of the Heller decision will not
come via courts. Indeed, Heller ultimately may turn out to have virtually
no direct effect on gun laws outside the District of Columbia and the very
159
small number of other jurisdictions that have handgun bans or gun
156

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006).
129 S. Ct. at 1087.
158
Id.
159
Chicago and a few other municipalities in northern Illinois had handgun bans
in effect at the time of the Heller decision. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct.
2783, 2864–65 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). San Francisco also had an ordinance
that purported to ban handguns, but it had already been declared invalid on other
grounds. See id. at 2865; Fiscal v. City & County of San Francisco, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 324,
326–28 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). Some of the Illinois cities with handgun bans responded
to Heller by amending their laws to permit possession of handguns for protection in
the home. See, e.g., National Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. City of Evanston, No. 08 C
157
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storage laws akin to those struck down in Heller. The real impact of
Heller will depend on how it affects the nation’s political and cultural
debate over guns, and whether it ultimately makes it easier or more
difficult to achieve progress on the issue of how we can protect and
promote socially beneficial uses of guns while reducing harmful ones.
The U.S. Supreme Court makes a lot of controversial decisions. On
virtually every issue, it draws strong criticism from some segment of
society. But despite all the talk about the Court being too conservative or
too liberal, and about the judges having unchecked discretion to do
whatever they want, the Court actually has a very strong tendency to
gravitate toward conclusions that match the predominant sentiment of
161
For example, on hot-button topics such as
the American public.
3693, 2008 WL 5070358, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 2008) (upholding city’s amended
statute banning handguns unless gun owner has state license and “said handgun is
kept at the residence of said person for self-protection”); Deborah Horan, Under Fire,
Suburbs Vote Down Gun Bans; Evanston Is the Latest to Repeal Its Handgun Ban, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 13, 2008, at C1. On the other hand, Chicago and a few other Illinois cities vowed
to defend their handgun bans in court. The fate of those laws ultimately will depend
on whether courts decide that the right to keep and bear arms applies to state and
local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment, a question left unanswered
by Heller. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2813 n.23. So far, courts have split on the question,
with a Ninth Circuit decision concluding that the right to keep and bear arms is
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, Nordyke v. King, No. 07-15763, 2009
WL 1036086, at *13 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2009), while some other courts have
determined that they are bound by pre-Heller precedents on this point and concluded
that whether to overrule those precedents is a question for the U.S. Supreme Court
to decide. See, e.g., Maloney v. Cuomo, 554 F.3d 56, 58–59 (2d Cir. 2009); National
Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Village of Oak Park, Nos. 08 C 3696, 08 C 3697, 2008 WL
5111163, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2008).
160
For example, Massachusetts has a law requiring each firearm to be “secured in
a locked container or equipped with a tamper-resistant mechanical lock” unless the
firearm is being “carried by” or is “under the control of” the gun owner or another
lawfully authorized user. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131L(a) (2009). Massachusetts
trial court judges have split on whether this law is invalid under Heller, with some
concluding that the Massachusetts statute is valid because it allows a gun to be
unlocked when the gun owner is at home and carrying or otherwise in control of the
firearm, and others concluding that the Massachusetts law is nevertheless too
restrictive and indistinguishable from the District of Columbia’s gun storage law
struck down in Heller. See David E. Frank, It’s (Not) a Lock: Massachusetts Judges Split over
Supreme Court Gun Ruling, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Mar. 16, 2009.
161
See Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596,
2606–07 (2003) (discussing how “the wealth of existing evidence suggests that most of
the time judicial decisions fall within the range of acceptability that one might expect
of the agents of popular government” and that “if there is a divergence, time—and
not too long a time—usually serves to ensure that the court bows to public opinion,
or confirms that public opinion was moving in the same direction as the Court’s
decisions”); Jack M. Balkin, Alive and Kicking: Why No One Truly Believes in a Dead
Constitution, SLATE, Aug. 29, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2125226/ (describing
how political scientists have found “that the Supreme Court never strays too far too
long from the center of the national political coalition” and so “[p]eople in the
political center usually get pretty much what they want”). For examples of the
voluminous literature on the relationship between Supreme Court decisions and
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affirmative action and abortion, the Court in recent years has rejected
extreme or absolute stands in either direction and instead staked out
positions that are very much in the middle ground and roughly
162
correspond to the median of American attitudes toward these issues.
With respect to the Second Amendment, I believe that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Heller does the same thing. The vast majority of
Americans feel that they should have a right to own and use guns if they
163
choose to do so. Indeed, most Americans believed they had such a
right long before Heller ever came along, regardless of how courts in the

public opinion, see DAVID G. BARNUM, THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
(Don Reisman et al. eds., 1993); THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE
SUPREME COURT (1989); Nathaniel Persily, Introduction to PUBLIC OPINION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008); ROBERT
WEISSBERG, PUBLIC OPINION AND POPULAR GOVERNMENT (1976); Cecilie Gaziano,
Relationship Between Public Opinion and Supreme Court Decisions: Was Mr. Dooley Right?, 5
COMM. RES. 131 (1978); Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous
Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J.
POL. 1018, 1019 (2004); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the
Attitudinal Model, and Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J.
POL. 169 (1996); James G. Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in Constitutional
Interpretation, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1037.
162
See, e.g., Loan Le & Jack Citrin, Affirmative Action, in PUBLIC OPINION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY, supra note 161, at 162, 181 (finding that most
Americans oppose racial preferences or quotas, but “[s]ofter” forms of affirmative
action receive much higher levels of public support, and Supreme Court decisions on
affirmative action “generally have hewed to this line”); Samantha Luks & Michael
Salamone, Abortion, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY, supra note
160, at 101 (finding that “[a]lthough commentators may consider abortion to be the
paradigmatic constitutional controversy, the survey data point to a public and
constitutional jurisprudence largely in sync with one another”); Neal Devins, The
Countermajoritarian Paradox, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1433, 1456 n.93 (1995) (stating that
Supreme Court’s “middle-ground approach” to abortion, “without question, matched
public opinion”); Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347
(2003) (describing how Supreme Court heeded social and political forces in its
rulings on affirmative action).
163
The majority of Americans, regardless of their political affiliation or whether
they own guns, believe that the Second Amendment gives them a right to have guns
for purposes unrelated to militia service. See Harris Interactive, Second Amendment
Supreme Court Ruling Matches with Public Opinion from the Harris Poll, June 26, 2008,
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=922 [hereinafter Harris Poll]
(finding that seventy percent of respondents, including eighty-four percent of
Republicans and sixty-five percent of Democrats, believe the Second Amendment
protects an individual’s right to bear arms and not just a state’s right to form a
militia); Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans in Agreement with Supreme Court on Gun Rights;
Nearly Three in Four Say Second Amendment Guarantees Right of Americans to Own Guns,
June 26, 2008 http://www.gallup.com/poll/108394/Americans-Agreement-SupremeCourt-Gun-Rights.aspx [hereinafter Gallup Poll] (finding that seventy-three percent
of respondents, including ninety-one percent of those who own guns and sixty-three
percent of those who do not, believe the Second Amendment protects the rights of
Americans to own guns even if they are not members of state militias).
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past interpreted the Second Amendment.
At the same time, an
overwhelming majority of Americans favor careful government
165
In particular, they support a system of gun
regulation of guns.
registration and gun owner licensing to maximize the extent to which
guns will be in the hands of responsible, well-trained users and to
minimize the extent to which they slip into the hands of children,
convicted criminals, and others who are not legally permitted to have
166
them. In short, the vast majority of Americans favor both gun rights
and gun control.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Heller roughly reflects that
predominant public sentiment. The Court concluded that the Second
Amendment gives people a right to have guns, but it is a right subject to
167
extensive regulation. If properly applied by courts in the future, Heller
will prevent governments in America from banning guns while at the
same time permitting all reasonable types of regulations, including laws
providing for background checks for everyone who acquires a gun, laws
taking advantage of technological advancements to keep track of guns

164
JAMES D. WRIGHT, PETER H. ROSSI & KATHLEEN DALY, UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS,
CRIME, AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 241 (Aldine Publishing Co. 1983) (“Large majorities
believe that they have a right to own guns and that the Constitution guarantees that
right. Most people also feel that a licensing requirement for handgun ownership
would not violate that right.”). For additional discussion of survey data suggesting
most Americans believe they have a Second Amendment right to have guns, see
Kates, supra note 17, at 206 & n.11; Thomas B. McAffee & Michael J. Quinlan,
Bringing Forward the Right to Keep and Bear Arms: Do Text, History, or Precedent Stand in the
Way?, 75 N.C. L. REV. 781, 792 & n.29 (1997); Jon S. Vernick et al., Public Opinion
Polling on Gun Policy, 12 HEALTH AFFAIRS, 198, 204–05 (1993).
165
The same recent surveys that show Americans believe they have a right to own
guns also show that most Americans want to maintain current laws or increase legal
controls on guns, and relatively few want restrictions on guns to be relaxed. See Harris
Poll, supra note 163 (finding that forty-nine percent of respondents favor stricter
control of guns, twenty-one percent want to maintain current laws, and twenty
percent favor less strict control); Gallup Poll, supra note 163 (finding that forty-nine
percent of respondents favor stricter gun laws, thirty-eight percent want to maintain
current laws, and eleven percent favor less strict gun laws). An enormous amount of
evidence from past surveys supports the same conclusion: Most Americans believe the
Constitution protects the right to have a gun, but they do not think that right is
violated by strict gun control laws. See Kates, supra note 17, at 206 n.11; see also ROBERT
J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 118 (Christopher J. Kelaher ed., 1995)
(reviewing poll data and observing that the “most important fact about public
opinion on gun control has been its remarkable consistency in support of greater
governmental control of guns”); Hazel Erskine, THE POLLS: GUN CONTROL, 36 PUB.
OPINION Q. 455, 455 (1972) (“The vast majority of Americans have favored some kind
of action for the control of civilian firearms at least as long as modern polling has
been in existence.”).
166
Rostron, supra note 53, at 565 & n.359.
167
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816–17 (2008).

DO NOT DELETE

2009]

5/14/2009 6:06 PM

GUN RIGHTS AND GUN CONTROL AFTER HELLER

415

168

and to identify those who misuse them, and laws requiring that gun
169
owners act responsibly in storing their weapons.
The Heller decision thus should not stand in the way of sensible,
effective gun control measures. The big question is whether it might
actually promote progress toward such measures by diminishing the
hostility surrounding the gun issue and alleviating the “slippery slope”
fears that have long stood in the way of achieving constructive reforms of
170
gun regulation. In the past, many gun owners have opposed even the
most modest gun control measures out of a concern that they will lead
inevitably to more drastic restrictions and eventually confiscation of all
171
guns. This is a concern shared by roughly half the nation, not just some
172
small fringe of the most militant opponents of gun control.
Organizations like the NRA continually play on these fears to rally
173
support. Gun control advocates frequently pour fuel on the fire by
sounding “anti-gun” rather than just “anti-gun-violence” or “pro-gun174
Legislators often have exacerbated the problem by
safety.”
incrementally implementing increasingly strict controls on guns rather
175
than pursuing comprehensive approaches.
The Heller decision should reduce these sorts of slippery slope
concerns. After all, the Supreme Court made clear that possession and
use of guns, at least for purposes of self-defense in the home, cannot be
176
completely prohibited. As Justice Scalia put it, that policy choice is now
168
See Muradyan, supra note 81, at 620 (describing new California law requiring
each semi-automatic pistol sold in the state, beginning in 2010, to have mechanism
leaving identifying microstamp mark on cartridge cases); Not a Magic Bullet, But…,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 27, 2002, at 10 (describing NRA’s opposition to
more effective use of technology to prevent and investigate gun crimes).
169
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
170
Rostron, supra note 53, at 562–63. For analysis of how we might measure the
real risks of slippery slopes, using the gun control issue as a key example, see Eugene
Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003).
171
Rostron, supra note 53, at 562–63.
172
Gary Kleck, Absolutist Politics in a Moderate Package: Prohibitionist Intentions of the
Gun Control Movement, in ARMED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON GUN CONTROL 129, 129–39
(Gary Kleck & Don B. Kates eds., 2001) (describing survey results indicating that half
of Americans fear a national gun registration program could lead to gun
confiscation).
173
See, e.g., Kristin A. Goss, Policy, Politics, and Paradox: The Institutional Origins of
the Great American Gun War, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 681, 682–83, 694, 710 (2004); Andrew
D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction of Dialogic
Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57, 86, 89–90 & n.126 (1995); Kenneth Lasson,
Blunderbuss Scholarship: Perverting the Original Intent and Plain Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 32 U. BALT. L. REV. 127, 161 (2003); Drew Westen, Guns on the Brain,
AMERICAN PROSPECT, June 2007, at 51.
174
Don B. Kates, Jr., Public Opinion: The Effects of Extremist Discourse on the Gun
Debate, in THE GREAT AMERICAN GUN DEBATE: ESSAYS ON FIREARMS & VIOLENCE 93, 96–98
(Don B. Kates, Jr. & Gary Kleck eds., 1997); Kleck, supra note 172, at 131–39.
175
Rostron, supra note 53, at 563.
176
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2822 (2008).
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“off the table.” Gun owners should realize the slope is not as slippery as
they once feared.
The change will take time, and it will need to overcome the
resistance of organizations like the NRA that will always have an interest
in insisting that gun rights are in grave peril. Within a week after the
announcement of the Heller decision, the NRA turned from celebrating
to issuing warnings to its faithful followers that the Supreme Court’s
ruling would aggravate “anti-gun anxiety” of the media, politicians, and
gun control activists, and that all could be lost unless NRA supporters
redoubled their efforts to ensure election of friendly candidates in the
178
upcoming November 2008 elections. The NRA soon began attacks on
Barack Obama, calling him the most anti-gun presidential candidate in
179
history. Of course, it made the same claim about John Kerry four years
180
ago, after having said the 2000 election was the most important since
181
and that Bill Clinton was the most anti-gun
the U.S. Civil War,
182
president in American history. Obama’s victory in the election sparked
183
a surge in gun sales and new efforts by the NRA to frighten gun
184
owners.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Heller obviously could not bring an
immediate end to that sort of overwrought hyperbole and fearmongering. Despite that, significant progress eventually can be made if
177

Id.
See NRAILA.org, Heller Decision Ramps Up Media’s Anti-Gun Hysteria, NATIONAL
RIFLE ASSOCIATION—INSTITUTE FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION, July 3, 2008,
http://www.nraila.org/Legislation/Federal/Read.aspx?id=4067.
179
Ben Smith, NRA: Obama Most Anti-Gun Candidate Ever, Will Ban Guns, POLITICO,
Aug. 6, 2008, http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/0808/NRA_Obama_most_
antigun_candidate_ever_will_ban_guns.html. A non-partisan fact checking organization
concluded that the NRA’s advertising “distorts Obama’s position on gun control
beyond recognition.” FactCheck.org, NRA Targets Obama, ANNENBERG POLITICAL FACT
CHECK, Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.factcheck.org/elections-2008/nra_targets_
obama.html.
180
Jack Kelly, NRA Campaigns Against Kerry, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 14,
2004, at A8 (quoting NRA Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre as saying “John
Kerry is the most anti-gun, anti-hunting presidential nominee in American history”).
181
Eunice Moscoso, Campaign 2000: NRA Blitz Turns Spotlight Back on Gun Control;
Charlton Heston Brings Pro-Gun Message to Georgia as Group’s Aggressive Campaign Puts Al
Gore on Defensive, ATL. J. & CONST., Nov. 4, 2000, at A12 (quoting NRA President
Charlton Heston as saying the 2000 presidential election is “the most important
election since the Civil War”); see also Susan Milligan, NRA’s Top Brass Aims for Gore;
Members Decry Gun-Control Proposals at Annual Meeting, BOSTON GLOBE, May 21, 2000, at
A25 (quoting NRA’s chief lobbyist James J. Baker as saying “This election will
determine whether or not the right to keep and bear arms will survive into the next
century. It’s that simple. We are at a crossroads.”).
182
Sandy Banisky, NRA Convention Takes Aim at Clinton; Its Theme Is “ABC,”
“Anybody But Clinton,” BALT. SUN, Apr. 22, 1996, at 1A.
183
Kirk Johnson, Buying Guns, for Fear of Losing the Right to Bear Them, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2008, at A20.
184
See, e.g., Amy Hunter, NRA CEO Predicts Obama Will Break Campaign Promises on
Protecting Second Amendment, BRISTOL HERALD COURIER (Va.), Nov. 8, 2008.
178
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the Court’s recognition of a constitutional right protecting ownership of
guns becomes a settled, familiar part of our legal, political, and cultural
landscapes. The most paranoid among us will never be satisfied, but the
vast majority of Americans in the middle ground, whether they lean to
the left or right side of it, can come together with a shared
understanding that the Second Amendment right to guns will never go
away, and at the same time that the right should never stand in the way of
adopting whatever measures will be most effective at promoting
beneficial uses of guns and minimizing their misuse.
V. CONCLUSION

For years before Heller, the Second Amendment posed a dilemma for
gun control advocates. I witnessed many debates and disagreements
within gun control circles about how much of a role, if any, constitutional
arguments should play in making the case for stronger gun laws.
On one side, some felt that the Second Amendment, and the very
narrow interpretation then being given to it by courts, should not be part
of the “talking points” or message for gun control. Some wanted to go
even further, ignore the courts, and embrace the idea that people have a
right to have guns, while emphasizing that this right comes with
responsibilities and limitations. In their view, trying to tell people that the
Second Amendment protected only military use of guns was
counterproductive. No matter how clearly or consistently courts had
interpreted the Second Amendment that way, most Americans believed
otherwise. Moreover, denying that there is a constitutional right to have
guns played into the hands of the NRA and its allies by giving credence to
their continual assertions that gun control is really about taking away all
guns, not just making sure they are used safely. Even politicians strongly
supportive of gun control efforts, like President Bill Clinton or Senator
Charles Schumer, sometimes expressed a belief that the Second
185
Amendment gave Americans a right to have guns.
Meanwhile, other gun control advocates recoiled at the thought of
conceding or downplaying constitutional arguments. In their view, the
Second Amendment clearly did not protect private use of guns, an
enormous pile of court precedent unanimously confirmed that
interpretation, and it would be crazy for the gun control movement not
to take maximum advantage of that fact. If most Americans

185

See, e.g., Fred LeBrun, Schumer Pushing for Hunting Easements, TIMES UNION
(Albany, N.Y.), Aug. 5, 2004, at C5 (quoting Sen. Schumer as saying “I’m a firm
believer in the right to bear arms” and “Why shouldn’t I be? The Second Amendment
is as important as the First, the Third and all the others.”); Todd S. Purdum, Shifting
Debate to the Political Climate, Clinton Condemns ‘Promoters of Paranoia,’ N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
25, 1995, at A19 (quoting President Clinton as saying “If we are to have freedom to
speak, freedom to assemble, and, yes, the freedom to bear arms, we must have
responsibility as well.”).
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misunderstood the meaning and significance of the Second Amendment,
the solution was to educate them, not to give up the point.
This was a difficult strategic issue, and I am not sure which side had
the better view. Either way, the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller has
ended the debate. Like it or not, the Second Amendment has been
authoritatively construed as giving people the right to have guns, at least
for purposes of self-defense in their homes. Fortunately, that need not
dismay anyone who believes in strong gun control measures such as a
comprehensive system of background checks, gun registration, and gun
owner licensing. Banning handguns or all guns is off the table, but with
the exception of a small number of the most liberal cities in the country,
those policy options were never really on the table in the first place. If
courts applying Heller properly recognize the very limited nature of what
the Supreme Court did, the Heller case ultimately may wind up being an
enormous help in the effort to achieve reasonable gun control measures.
Rather than being a win for the “pro-gun” side or a setback for “anti-gun”
forces, it may turn out simply to have been a victory for all Americans,
having finally driven home to everyone that respecting gun rights and
achieving sound gun control are not mutually exclusive endeavors.

